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INTRODUCTION
Introducing the new edition of Karl Llewellyn’s The Theory of
Rules, Fred Schauer writes that “[i]n Great Britain and much of the rest
of the common law world, Legal Realism is taught mostly as a joke, or
at least as a convenient foil for demonstrating the wisdom of H.L.A.
Hart.”1 Schauer of course has American Legal Realism in mind when
he thus objects to the failure to take Legal Realism seriously. It is
often overlooked however that this particular brand of Legal Realism
was not the only victim of Hart’s critique to which Schauer is
implicitly alluding.2 In fact, the immediate target of some of the most
celebrated remarks of Hart as the great English Legal Positivist of the
20th century was Scandinavian Legal Realism, a school of legal theory
contemporary with and in many ways related to American Legal
Realism but today unknown to most legal scholars in the United States.
In particular, Hart’s aim was the Dane Alf Ross whom he later
described as “the most acute and best-equipped philosopher of this
school”.3 Reviewing in 1959 the English translation of Alf Ross’s On
Law and Justice (1958, 1st Danish ed. 1953), Hart articulated the key
elements of his famous critique that only later in The Concept of Law
was broadened to include Legal Realism as such.4
This critique had a lasting negative effect on the Anglo-American
reception of Ross’s work reducing him too to the role as an extra in the
great H.L.A. Hart show.5 Thus, e.g. the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy states, in reference to these works, that ‘Hart famously
demolished’ Ross’s analysis of normative statements and thereby
strongly influenced the contemporary perception that Scandinavian
Realism is “more a museum piece than a live contender in
jurisprudential debate”.6

1. Frederick Schauer, Introduction to KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES
1, 4 (Karl N. Llewellyn & Frederick Schauer eds., 2011).
2. See infra Parts I & III for a detailed presentation of Hart’s critique of Legal
Realism.
3. See H. L. A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence 13 (1983).
4. See H. L. A. Hart, Scandinavian Realism, 17 THE CAMBRIDGE L.J. 233–40 (1959);
See also H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 136–47 (2nd ed. 1994).
5. Another highly influential factor is Ross’s heavy reliance on the tenets of logical
positivism which not many modern philosophers consider viable today. For an attempt to
overcome this challenge, see: Jakob v. H. Holtermann, Naturalizing Alf Ross’s Legal
Realism: A Philosophical Reconstruction, REVUS. J. FOR CONST. THEORY AND PHIL. OF L.
165–86 (2014); Jakob v. H. Holtermann, Getting Real or Staying Positive: Legal Realism(s),
Legal Positivism and the Prospects of Naturalism in Jurisprudence, RATIO JURIS: AN INT'L
J. OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHIL. OF L. 535-55 (2015).
6. Brian Leiter, Naturalism in Legal Philosophy, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed. 2014). It bears noting that Leiter emphasizes that he is
referring only to the long-term effects of Hart’s critique on the reception of Ross’s theory,
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Crucial to this alleged demolition was Hart’s – in legal theory
well-known and much celebrated – introduction of a
distinction between internal and external aspects of social rules.7
Indeed, Hart originally introduced this distinction in his work at least
partly in order to demonstrate what he perceived to be fundamental
inadequacies of legal realism in general and of Ross’s legal theory in
particular.8
In this Article, I argue that received opinion is mistaken. Or
rather, since I do not discuss Scandinavian Realism as such but limit
my discussion to Ross’s legal philosophy as formulated in his main
work On Law and Justice,9 I make the more modest claim that received
opinion is mistaken with regard to this particular theory. I am not the
first to make this claim. Indeed, Ross himself made it already in his
return review of The Concept of Law, where—being true to character—
he had considerable problems hiding his hurt feelings over Hart’s harsh
judgement and expressed his “belief that in fundamentals the Oxford
philosophy and the Scandinavian Approach have more in common than
Hart has been able to see.”10
Maintaining a more coolheaded approach a small number of other
authors have since followed suit.11 Although the efforts of these
authors are commendable, my claim in this paper is that, as a result of
the way they have constructed the argument, they have predominantly
and that Leiter makes certain reservations about the correctness of Hart’s rendering of
Ross’s analysis and thereby also of the soundness of Hart’s critique. For similar assessments
without reservations for soundness, see, e.g., Thomas Mautner, Some Myth about Realism,
23 RATIO JURIS 422–25 (2010); Scott J. Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of View?, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1157 (2006). For similar assessments of long-term effect which
challenge Hart’s argument more directly, see, e.g., Enrico Pattaro, From Hägerström to
Ross and Hart, 22 RATIO JURIS 532 (2009); Svein Eng, Lost in the System or Lost in
Translation? The Exchanges between Hart and Ross, 24 RATIO JURIS 194 (2011).
7. This internal/external distinction shall be elaborated on further below. See infra
Part I. For now, the external aspect of legal rules can preliminarily be defined as the
outwardly observable regularities of behaviour that the observance of rules has in common
with a group that follows a social habit. The internal aspect, by contrast, refers to that
element which singles out rule-governed social practices from mere group habits, and
which, according to Hart, is characterized by the existence in members of the group of an
outwardly unobservable so-called critical reflective attitude towards deviation from the
standards of behaviour expressed by the rule.
8. See Hart, Scandinavian Realism, supra note 4, at 237–38; See also H. L. A. HART,
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 13–14 (1983).
9. ALF ROSS, ON LAW AND JUSTICE (1958) (Original in Danish, Om ret og
retfærdighed : En indførelse i den analytiske retsfilosofi (Nyt Nordisk Forlag. Arnold Busck
A/S 1. ed. 1953)).
10. Alf Ross, Review of H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 71 Yale L.J. 1190 (1962);
See also Alf Ross, Validity and the Conflict Between Legal Positivism and Natural Law,
REVISTA JURIDICA DE BUENOS AIRES 84-88 (1961).
11. See MICHAEL MARTIN, LEGAL REALISM: AMERICAN AND SCANDINAVIAN (1997);
See also Pattaro, supra note 6; See also Eng, supra note 6.
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drawn the wrong conclusions. In particular, I disagree with the view
initially championed by Ross himself that once we have the
misunderstandings behind Hart’s criticism sorted out we learn that they
were actually in agreement. The latest argument to this effect was
launched by the Norwegian legal philosopher and widely recognized
Ross-scholar Svein Eng, whose otherwise very commendable study
concludes that Hart’s method was in fact also Ross’s method and that
any perception of a theoretical gulf between them is therefore wrong.12
I believe however that this conclusion is mistaken, first because it
simultaneously underestimates and overestimates the theoretical
sophistication of Ross’s and Hart’s theories respectively, and second
because it blurs what I take to be the really important theoretical
distinction between the two.
It is after all fairly easy to establish that Ross in fact predates Hart
in introducing a distinction between internal and external aspects of
social rules.13 What is more interesting is that we find this distinction
analysed and expressed with much greater clarity and consistency in
Ross’s writings. Thus, behind Hart’s writings on internal and external
aspects of social rules there lies not one but two important distinctions
that are logically distinct, and Hart consistently confuses these two
distinctions and their interrelations. Ross, on the other hand, is not
only very well aware of their existence; his entire theory revolves
around an acute appreciation of their jurisprudential significance. He
expressly addresses issues connected with both of them, and, in
contrast to Hart, he consistently observes both of them throughout his
writings.
Setting the record straight on these issues holds the promise
therefore not only of shedding light on the debates about internal and
external aspects of social rules and law generally that have dominated
large parts of legal philosophy for more than fifty years.
More importantly, by pinpointing exactly how Hart’s and Ross’s
methods are not the same, this debate gives us a privileged opportunity
to redraw the broader theoretical landscape of jurisprudence and in
particular of identifying exactly where we could draw the line between
legal positivism and legal realism in a clear and principled way.
In order to convincingly argue this point we need to go back and
closely re-examine the debate between Ross and Hart. I shall therefore
proceed as follows. First, I summarize Hart’s motivation for
12. See Eng, supra note 6, at 241–42.
13. For these purposes my focus is ON LAW AND JUSTICE to the exclusion of Ross’s
earlier works because his legal philosophy underwent a significant development on these
crucial issues, and it is only in this latter work that we find the relevant distinctions worked
out with sufficient clarity.
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introducing the distinction between internal and external aspects of
rules, and in so doing I make a first approximation of Hart’s criticism
of Ross’s theory. Second, I show why the argument thus constructed
misfires in so far that it overlooks both Ross’s distinction between
behaviourist and introspective methods and his explicit acceptance of
the latter in legal science. Third, I consider a second and somewhat
more convincing version of Hart’s criticism which admits that Ross did
not simply overlook the internal aspect of social rules, but claims
instead that he misinterpreted it. Fourth, I show how this objection
rests on a failure to appreciate the subtlety and richness of Ross’s
position by overlooking a second, logically distinct distinction which is
crucially at play in Ross’s theory, i.e. the distinction between normdescriptive and norm-expressive propositions. Fifth, I summarise the
main results of the discussion and try to locate what I believe to be the
real disagreement between Ross and Hart.
I. HART’S OBJECTION # 1: HABITS AND SOCIAL RULES AND THE
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF SOCIAL RULES
Hart’s introduction of the distinction between internal and external
aspects is motivated by his discussion of what rules are, and of what it
means to say that rules exist.14 As a first candidate-answer, Hart
famously considers the so-called predictive account which he finds
unsatisfactory because it confounds two distinct social phenomena:
rule-governed behaviour and mere habit-based convergent behaviour.15
What is missing in the predictive account and what ultimately singles
out rule-governed social practises from mere group habits, Hart finds,
is the existence of a particular critical reflective attitude among
members of the group:
What is necessary is that there should be a critical reflective
attitude to certain patterns of behaviour as a common standard, and
that this should display itself in criticism (including self-criticism),
demands for conformity, and in acknowledgments that such
criticism and demands are justified, all of which find their
characteristic expression in the normative terminology of ‘ought’,

14. This part of Hart’s theory is well-rehearsed in the literature. However, part of the
reason why the discussion has gone astray is insufficient attention to certain details. I shall
therefore go to some length elaborating first Hart’s and later Ross’s line of reasoning on the
relevant issues.
15. See Hart supra note 4, in particular chapters I, IV and V – although in chapter IV
Hart’s immediate object of discussion is so-called habit-based accounts of obedience but his
argument is continuous and consistent with the arguments applied in his critique of the
predictive account. For ease of expression I shall only refer to the predictive account.
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I shall get back to the details of this account later. What is
important at this point is that this attitude according to Hart constitutes
the internal aspect of rules, which differs from their external aspect
consisting merely in the outwardly observable regularities of behaviour
that rules have in common with social habits.17
It is not entirely clear whether Hart himself believed that these
deficiencies in the so-called predictive account could also be ascribed
to Ross’s legal theory as it is presented in On Law and Justice. On the
one hand, it appears that the immediate object of Hart’s criticism is
Austin’s “command-model” with its emphasis on the notion of habit.18
But Hart elaborates at some length in his review of Ross the
shortcomings of identifying statements about rules with predictions of
behaviour, which in context makes it natural to assume that this view is
attributed also to Ross. Also, Hart later wrote that his main objection
to Ross’s legal philosophy was precisely the same as against the
predictive account: that Ross failed “to mark and explain the crucial
distinction that there is between mere regularities of human behaviour
and rule-governed behaviour.”19
Thus there is at least some textual evidence supporting the reading
of Hart’s criticism presented thus far as being directed not only against
Austin’s command theory and “the predictive account” but also against
Ross.
II. ROSS ON THE INTERNAL1-EXTERNAL1 DISTINCTION
Qua criticism of Ross, however, the argument thus constructed
misfires rather badly. If what we are after is a distinction which makes
us capable of telling these two social phenomena apart, then such a

16. HART, supra note 4, at 57.
17. In close connection with this distinction between internal and external aspects of
rules Hart introduces two additional, philosophically important internal/external distinctions,
viz. the twin distinctions between internal and external points of view and between internal
and external (legal) statements respectively. See Id. at 291. These two distinctions map on
to the first distinction in such a way that they would appear to be merely additional aspects
of the same fundamental distinction: the distinction between internal and external points of
view appears to describe the two different perspectives from which one can identify the
internal and the external aspects of rules respectively. Correspondingly, statements made
from either of these two points of view on the adhering aspect of social rules could be called
internal and external (legal) statements respectively.
18. John Austin (1790-1859) is by many considered the founder of analytical
jurisprudence and legal positivism.
See J. AUSTIN, AUSTIN: THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, (Wilfred E. Rumble ed., Revised ed. 1995).
19. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 8, at 13. This is
also how Hart’s argument has been read—at least occasionally. See, e.g., Leiter, supra note
6, at 191; See also Shapiro, supra note 6, at 1163.
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distinction is clearly present in Ross’s writings. In order to illustrate
this point, we need to rehearse the core of Ross’s legal philosophy as
presented in On Law and Justice. Again, this may seem familiar to
some readers but the exposition provides premises in an argument the
conclusion of which has not been considered commonplace.
We can of course appreciate why the idea that Ross was unable to
distinguish between these two social phenomena can have occurred in
the first place. After first taking Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of law and
later Axel Hägerström’s anti-metaphysical Uppsala-school as his main
philosophical inspirations, the Alf Ross we encounter in On Law and
Justice (1958, Danish original 1953) is inspired mainly by the
philosophical tenets of logical positivism.20
Crucial to this
philosophical school is the possibility of establishing inter-subjective
verifiability of any proposition claiming to be scientific—a criterion to
be met either directly or derivatively from propositions that are thus
verifiable.
Taking this starting point it does indeed seem that, among
scientific disciplines, the study of law presents a particular challenge.
Ross considers law to be a body of rules, i.e. of norms prescribing
behaviour.21
Linguistically Ross categorizes such norms as
directives.22 Directives are usually (but not always) identifiable by
normative words like “shall be,” “may,” “must,” etc.23 Furthermore,
Ross observes that sentences traditionally found in scholarly legal
doctrinal work appear linguistically to be no different from the
directives of legal rules: they apparently prescribe behaviour frequently
using the same kind of deontic markers.24
The epistemological challenge arises because it is not clear how
such normative propositions can honour the strict criteria for being
scientific adopted by logical positivism. In particular, we see why
Ross must ban the epistemological strategy of natural law, which, in
his interpretation, is rationalist: it attempts to derive the validity of
normative legal statements from a foundation of self-evident truths of
reason. More specifically, natural law tries to derive legal validity
from one foundational, intuitively valid idea of justice which is
constitutive of law, and to which all human beings, qua rational

20. See Ross supra note 9.
21. ROSS, supra note 9, at 6-11.
22. See Ross, supra note 9 at 7.
23. As a random example of a directive, Ross mentions “the rule in the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Act, s. 62, which prescribes that the acceptor of a negotiable
instrument engages that he will pay it according to the tenor of his acceptance.” Id. at 32–
33.
24. Id. at 9.
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creatures, have access and will assent.25
To the logical positivist, however, the problem with such
intuitions is that they, in contrast to sense perceptions, are inextricably
private. Intuitions can vary from person to person— and patently do so
quite often. As Ross puts it in one of his most quoted passages:
Like a harlot, natural law is at the disposal of everyone. The
ideology does not exist that cannot be defended by an appeal to the
law of nature. And, indeed, how can it be otherwise, since the
ultimate basis for every natural right lies in a private direct insight,
an evident contemplation, an intuition. Cannot my intuition be just
as good as yours? Evidence as a criterion of truth explains the
utterly arbitrary character of the metaphysical assertions. It raises
them up above any force of inter-subjective control and opens the
26
door wide to unrestricted invention and dogmatics.

It is often overlooked, however, that while striking a less hostile
pose Ross is in fact equally dismissive of the legal positivists’ attempts
to justify statements of legal doctrine formally on the basis of a
foundational norm regardless of its moral value (a Grundnorm or a rule
of recognition).27 Thus shunning the two traditional foundationalist
strategies for the doctrinal study of law, Ross seems forced to take a
wholly different tack. In particular, it seems that he, as a logical
positivist, has no other option but to adopt a strictly behaviourist
approach to law.28 Banning private intuitions of justice we seem to be
left with publicly observable regularities of human behaviour. But this
way it seems we would be definitively barred, on pain of committing
the naturalistic fallacy, from recognizing the normative element so
characteristic of law.29 And insofar that this is the case, it could seem

25. See Id. at 65–66. As an example of such an idea of justice Ross mentions Kant’s
formulation of the highest principle of law: “A course of action is lawful if the liberty to
pursue it is compatible with the liberty of every other person under a general rule.” Id. at
276. Thus if the acceptor of a negotiable instrument has a duty to pay, it is ultimately
because it would be incompatible with the liberty of every other person under a general rule
if she did not have such a duty.
26. Id. at 261.
27. See Holtermann, Getting Real or Staying Positive: Legal Realism(s), Legal
Positivism and the Prospects of Naturalism in Jurisprudence, supra note 5, at 543–44; See
also ROSS, supra note 9, at 9–10; See also Ross’s early criticism of Kelsen, Alf Ross, The
25th Anniversary of the Pure Theory of Law, 31 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 248–49
(2011).
28. Loosely defined, behaviourism is the view that human phenomena can be
accurately studied only through objectively observable behavioural events, as opposed to
internal events like thinking or feeling.
29. Thus, in the Danish version of On Law and Justice, Ross writes on the
epistemological difficulties presented by a parallel directive found in the Danish Bills of
Exchange Act: “. . . what is a ‘duty’, and how do we ascertain empirically that it has been
established? The acceptance which takes place by drawing some strokes of ink on a piece of
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that Ross-style legal science had indeed failed “to mark and explain the
crucial distinction between mere regularities of human behaviour and
rule-governed behaviour” exactly as Hart claimed.30
I submit, however, that this reading of Ross’s considerations on
the possibility of legal science is wrong. Looking carefully at the text,
it is, as we shall see in the following, undeniable that Ross explicitly
countenances the invocation of mental entities over and beyond
observable behaviour. As we shall see, he does so through the
adoption of an approach not only strikingly similar to the one later
adopted by Hart (as outlined above) but also motivated by virtually the
same considerations, i.e. the full recognition that austere behaviourism
cannot distinguish rule bound behaviour from other kinds of regular
behaviour.
In order to illustrate the problems facing behaviourism, Ross
introduces a very rewarding chess analogy which Hart passes by in
almost complete silence.31 Ross asks us to imagine ourselves watching
a game of chess and trying to understand the rules without any prior
knowledge.32 The pressing epistemological concern is how we should
proceed in order to establish such knowledge. Or as Ross writes:
“How is it possible then to establish which rules (directives) govern the
game of chess?”33 And he continues:
One could perhaps think of approaching the problem from the
behaviourist angle— limiting oneself to what can be established by
external observation of the actions and then finding certain
34
regularities.

The problem is, however, just as Hart observed, that any attempt
to determine the rules from such an external point of view remains
underdetermined by the data: we can never tell whether a regularity
found in the game is determined by the rules of chess or merely the
manifestation of custom:35
But in this way an insight into the rules of the game would never be
achieved. It would never be possible to distinguish actual custom,
or even regularities conditioned by the theory of the game, from the

paper does not appear to count among its observable effects anything that can be termed
‘duty.’” Ross, Om ret og retfærdighed : En indførelse i den analytiske retsfilosofi, at 16.
1953, my translation.
30. See Hart, supra note 8 at 13.
31. In fact, Hart at one point applies the exact same analogy and for virtually the same
purposes, i.e. in order to illustrate the insufficiency of the external perspective to the study
of rules. HART, supra note 4, at 56–57.
32. See Ross, supra note 9, at 11.
33. ROSS, supra note 9, at 15.
34. Id. at 15.
35. Custom is used here as synonymous with habit, not as a source of law.
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rules of chess proper. Even after watching a thousand games it
would still be possible to believe that it is against the rules to open
36
with a rook’s pawn.

From these considerations Ross’s conclusion appears
unmistakable: “Thus we cannot but adopt an introspective method.”37
Consequently the rules of chess are analysed as a two-sided
phenomenon which at least looks quite similar to Hart’s internal and
external aspects of social rules:
Accordingly we can say: a rule of chess ‘is valid’ means that within
a given fellowship [. . .] this rule is effectively adhered to, because
the players feel themselves to be socially bound by the directive
contained in the rule. The concept of validity (in chess) involves
two elements. The one refers to the actual effectiveness of the rule
which can be established by outside observation. The other refers
to the way in which the rule is felt to be motivating, that is, socially
38
binding.

Transferred to the scientific study of law, Ross’s conclusion
regarding the insufficiency of austere behaviourism is equally clear:
What is valid law cannot be ascertained by purely behaviouristic
means, that is, by external observation of regularities in the
reactions (customs) of the judges. [. . .]
A behaviouristic interpretation, then, achieves nothing. The
changing behaviour of the judge can only be comprehended and
predicted through ideological interpretation, that is, by means of the
hypothesis of a certain ideology which animates the judge and
motivates his actions.
[. . .] [L]aw presupposes, not only regularity in the judge’s mode of
action, but also his experience of being bound by the rules. In the
concept of validity two points are involved: partially the outward
observable and regular compliance with a pattern of action, and
partly the experience of this pattern of action as being a socially
39
binding norm.

One might object that in thus banning pure behaviourism Ross is
in fact contradicting his own empiricist position. I shall get back to this
point below (section IV.A). Suffice to say here that it is preferable, on
account of charity, to opt for an interpretation of his general
epistemological commitments that is compatible with key passages like
those above from the opening chapters of his book. We cannot simply
infer from Ross’s programmatic allegiance to logical positivism that he
36.
37.
38.
39.

ROSS, supra note 9, at 15 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
Id. at 37; see, e.g., Id. at 73.
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must hold this or that view on the study of law. When it comes to a full
determination of Ross’s epistemological stance the proof of the
pudding is in the eating.
On the basis of the account so far it would therefore appear fair to
conclude that any failure regarding the issue of rule-governed vs. mere
habitual behavioural regularities cannot be ascribed to Ross somehow
overlooking the distinction between these two social phenomena. On
the contrary, as we have seen, Ross is fully aware of that very
distinction, and of its importance for legal science. And most
importantly, he tries to capture this by means apparently similar to
those later adopted by Hart; i.e. by supplementing the external
behaviourist approach with an internal, or, in Ross’s terminology,
introspective method.
III. HART’S OBJECTION # 2: THE PROBLEM WITH “FEELINGS”; OR HOW
ROSS FUNDAMENTALLY MISINTERPRETS THE INTERNAL ASPECTS OF
SOCIAL RULES

From this it seems that any charge of failure against Ross must
take instead the shape of an argument that in spite of his explicit
recognition of the problem and his attempt to develop the necessary
methodological tools to manage it, he—unlike Hart—nevertheless
fails. And in so far that this is the real claim we should expect a
demonstration how, in spite of the apparent similarities found so far,
there are in fact substantial differences between Ross and Hart.
Furthermore, we should expect those differences to be sufficiently
important to justify not only the claim that Hart’s adoption of the
distinction between internal and external aspects “famously
demolished” Ross’s research program in legal philosophy but also the
common perception that legal philosophy owes any important insights
captured by that distinction to Hart.
Indeed, on closer inspection this appears to better capture Hart’s
argument. Thus, Hart admits elsewhere that Ross in fact did not
commit the simple error sometimes ascribed to him of overlooking the
distinction between rule-governed and habitual behaviour and of
equating legal rules with regular behaviour:
Ross is right in thinking that we must distinguish an internal as
well as an external aspect of the phenomenon presented by the
existence of social rules. This is true and very important for the
40
understanding of any kind of rule.

The problem is rather that Ross gives an inaccurate picture of the

40. Hart, Scandinavian Realism, supra note 4, at 237.
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internal aspect of social rules: “[U]nfortunately he draws the line
between these aspects in the wrong places.”41 In particular, he
“misrepresents the internal aspect of rules as a matter of ‘emotion’ or
‘feeling’—as a special psychological ‘experience.’”42 And in this light,
it seems reasonable that Hart later described his review of Ross’s On
Law and Justice as being primarily an attempt to explain “the
important differences between ‘mere feelings of being bound’ which
Ross includes in his analysis, and the internal point of view of one who
accepts a rule.”43
In explaining these differences, Hart stresses the importance of
full recognition of the normative uses of legal language for a proper
understanding of the internal aspect of legal rules:
They [members of a group that has rules] [. . .] treat deviations as a
reason for such reaction and demands for conformity as justified.
When a pattern of behaviour is thus taken as a standard the
criticism of conduct in terms of it and the claims and justifications
based on it are expressed by the distinctive normative vocabulary
of ‘ought,’ ‘must,’ ‘should,’ ‘may,’ ‘right,’ ‘wrong,’ and special
variants like ‘duty’ and ‘obligation.’ The forms ‘I (you, he, they)
ought to do that’ and ‘I (you, etc.) ought not to have done that’ are
the most general ones used to discharge these critical normative
44
functions which indeed constitute their meaning.

In Hart’s view, however, Ross’s talk of “feelings of compulsion”
fails to track this kind of normative discourse:
[T]he internal character of these statements is not a mere matter of
the speaker having certain ‘feelings of compulsion’; for though
these may indeed often accompany the making of such statements
they are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions of their
normative use in criticising conduct, making claims, and justifying
45
hostile reactions by reference to the accepted standard.

As we shall see further below (IV.E), much depends for this line
of reasoning on what exactly is meant by the elusive term “feelings,”
and in particular on whether Ross by using it intended to exclude
anything like the normative uses of language alluded to by Hart.
Suffice to note here, that Hart seems simply to take for granted that
Ross’s professed empiricist starting point implies that he cannot “allow
for the internal non-factual, non-predictive uses of language
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 8, at 14.
Hart, Scandinavian Realism, supra note 4, at 238; See also HART, supra note 4, at

57.
45. Hart, Scandinavian Realism, supra note 4, at 238.
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inseparable from the use of rules,”46 (i.e. the uses of language which
according to Hart in the above quote is characterized by “the distinctive
normative vocabulary of ‘ought,’ ‘must,’ ‘should,’ ‘may,’ ‘right,’
‘wrong,’ and special variants like ‘duty’ and ‘obligation.’”) And
correspondingly, he accuses Ross of creating, with his talk of feelings,
“the impression that what Kelsen terms ‘ought-propositions’ may be
dispensed with in the analysis of legal thinking.”47
Again, this interpretation of Ross may not be entirely
unmotivated. Taking into account what Hart refers to as Ross’s
“misplaced affection for the battle cry of ‘meaningless’”48 and recalling
Ross’s fierce attack on natural law,49 it would seem that by adopting an
introspective method in addition to behaviourism he has already come
dangerously close to “metaphysics.” Any acceptance, in addition, of
“ought-propositions,” i.e. of normative statements asserting what
behaviour is legal required of us, it seems, would irretrievably betray
his epistemological starting point in logical positivism. For that reason
it would seem that the only analysis of the internal aspect compatible
with Ross’s empiricism is one that, under the heading “judges’
normative ideology,” dissolves this entire aspect into one massive blob
of blind “feelings of compulsion”—impermeable to analysis and
impossible to sketch out in phenomenological depth or detail.
And we can also understand why on this interpretation of Ross
Hart can take his own version of the internal aspect to be
fundamentally different.
Given Hart’s background in the
(epistemologically speaking) more liberal Austinian ordinary language
philosophy he can simply declare that “[t]he dimensions of legal
language are far richer than this allows. . . . ‘[O]ught-propositions’ and
other forms of normative internal statements are both necessary and
harmless in the analysis of legal thinking . . .”50
IV. ROSS ON THE INTERNAL2-EXTERNAL2: NORM-EXPRESSIVE AND
NORM-DESCRIPTIVE PROPOSITIONS
While we can perhaps follow Hart’s reasons for interpreting Ross
this way, and while we may even find the criticism well founded with
regard to the quite rigid behaviourist position which Ross held in the
early years of his career,51 Hart’s reading nevertheless fails to properly
appreciate the richness and subtlety of Ross’s position from 1953
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 238.
Id. at 237.
Id. at 235.
See Ross, supra note 9, at 261.
Id. at 239.
See, e.g., Ross, The 25th Anniversary of the Pure Theory of Law, supra note 24.
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onwards. As it turns out, there is in fact nothing in Ross’s mature legal
philosophy to keep him from acknowledging such “oughtpropositions” or admitting other forms of normative internal statements
in his analysis of legal thinking. And the widespread failure to observe
this is arguably illustrative of the dangers of performing exegesis of
individual thinkers on the broad level of general “isms” instead of
paying close attention to the distinctiveness of their actual writings.52
More precisely, Ross can include these aspects because of his
acute appreciation of a different kind of “internal” and “external”
distinction than the one Hart points to. This distinction is too often
overlooked or at least only partly comprehended even though its
significance can hardly be overestimated in the study of Ross’s legal
philosophy—or in legal philosophy generally. And, as we shall see,
Hart’s failure to observe that particular distinction in Ross’s writings
bears witness to his own general failure to appreciate it, at least in
1961, when in The Concept of Law he repeatedly conflates this
distinction with the one he invoked in order to tell the difference
between regular and rule-based behaviour.53
In Ross’s terminology this second internal-external distinction (in
addition to the one already considered between the application of
behaviourist and introspective method) is the distinction between
norm-descriptive and norm-expressive propositions. In a key passage
Ross outlines the basic idea thus:
Since the doctrinal study [of law] is concerned with norms it can be
called normative. But the term must not be misunderstood. . . .
[C]ognitive propositions can naturally not be made up of norms
(directives).
They have to consist of assertions—assertions
concerning norms, which again means assertions to the effect that
certain norms are of the nature of ‘valid law.’ The normative
character of the doctrinal study of law signifies, therefore, that it is
a doctrine concerning norms, and not of norms. It does not aim at
‘setting up’ or expressing norms, but at establishing their character
of ‘valid law.’ The doctrinal study of law is normative in the sense
54
of norm descriptive and not in the sense of norm expressive.

It may not be immediately clear what is captured by a distinction
between two such kinds or modes of normativity-talk, or how
propositions of legal science could suddenly be transformed into
52. Alternatively, one could say that the problem is one of ignoring or over-simplifying
the various isms. In Ross’s case it is presumably a combination of both since logical
positivism was not completely uniform as a movement. I shall get back to this point below.
53. See in particular Hart, supra note 4, at 84-88 and associated endnote at 291. The
endnote mentions the relevant distinction but Hart’s general argument proceeds in apparent
disregard thereof.
54. ROSS, supra note 9, at 19 (last emphasis added).
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epistemologically safe assertions if they only stay on the ‘normdescriptive’ side of the gap.
For illustration, imagine six-year-old Ellen has been exposed to
Norse folklore, and one day around Christmas says to her father: “We
ought to leave some rice pudding in the attic for the pixie.” In spite of
Ellen’s sincerity, we may safely assume that her claim is not true. We
do not as a matter of fact have any duties toward imaginary creatures
like pixies. However, imagine that later the same day Ellen’s father
tells his wife: “Ellen believes that we ought to leave some rice pudding
in the attic for the pixie.” In virtue of this small addition, the case is
completely changed. This is so because, in contrast to the first
statement, the truth value of the latter is entirely independent of the
existence or not of duties toward imaginary creatures. It depends
solely upon whether or not Ellen actually believes in the existence of
such a duty. And this is ultimately a psychological question regarding
her beliefs, not a normative (i.e. norm expressive) question about the
existence of duties toward pixies.

Figure 1. The relation between Ellen’s own norm-expressive
and her father’s norm-descriptive statement.
This analogy illustrates an insight traditionally attributed to
Gottlob Frege55: if a given proposition P (where P can be both an
55. Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) was a German philosopher, logician, and
mathematician who is often accredited with having provided the foundations for modern
logic. See, e.g., Edward N. Zalta, Gottlob Frege, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed. 2016).
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assertion and a directive) is embedded in a so-called propositional
attitude report (i.e. in a sentence stating that an agent A believes that,
claims that, feels that, etc. P), the truth value of that particular
proposition has no bearing on the truth value of the compound
proposition, i.e. the propositional attitude report.56 Whether or not
things actually are the way A believes, claims, feels, etc., is irrelevant
to the truth of the whole propositional attitude report. In such contexts
the question is instead whether or not A in fact bears the kind of
attitude toward P asserted in the report, i.e. whether or not she actually
believes, claims, feels, etc. that things are/ought to be in the way stated
in the proposition.
And it is precisely this shift in truth values following the
introduction of a propositional attitude context which Ross refers to
when he insists that legal science should be norm-descriptive and not
norm-expressive.57 A norm-expressive statement, then, is a statement
that directly expresses acceptance or endorsement (if only
hypothetically) of a given legal norm. A norm-descriptive statement,
by contrast, inserts a propositional attitude context around this legal
norm and thus renders the truth-value of it (or lack thereof) immaterial
to the truth value of the compound norm-descriptive proposition. Or,
to use Ross’s linguistic categories: the latter is a directive while the
former is an assertion stating that a particular attitudinal relation exists
between an agent and that directive.
In order to comprehend the full implications of this paraphrasing
of the propositions of legal doctrine into norm-descriptive
propositions, i.e. into propositional attitude reports, we should observe
how Ross answers three questions that are pertinent whenever such
reports are made: To whom are we ascribing the attitude? What kind of
attitude are we ascribing? And toward which proposition are we
ascribing it?
As to the first of these questions, Ross holds that the bearer of the
relevant propositional attitude is the judiciary in the jurisdiction under
scrutiny.58 It is the judges’ beliefs or feelings regarding legal directives
that should be studied by the legal scholar and not, e.g., those of
lawyers generally or of ordinary citizens for that matter.59
As to the third question, Ross, unlike Hart but like Kelsen,
believes that the legal norms relevant to the doctrinal study of law are
those that are directed to the judges, and which prescribe how they
56. See GOTTLOB FREGE, ON SENSE AND REFERENCE, IN BASIC TOPICS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 149 (Robert M. Harnish ed., Revised Edition, 1994).
57. See Ross, supra note 9, at 19.
58. It should be emphasized that groups can also be bearers of propositional attitudes.
59. See, e.g., ROSS, supra note 9, at 35.
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should exercise their authority in cases falling under these norms .60
Answering the second of these questions is more difficult,
especially in the context of Hart’s criticism. As we have seen, Ross
believes that besides the actual behavioural effectiveness (which a legal
rule shares with a habit), its validity consists in ‘the way in which the
rule is felt to be motivating, that is, socially binding.61 In other words,
the propositional attitude attributed to the judges seems to be
something like: “[judge A] feels that [rule X] is motivating/socially
binding.” As we also saw, Hart believed that this attitude differs
crucially from the critical reflective attitude which he ascribed to the
internal perspective, and which could be stated along these lines:
“[judge A] accepts as a standard of behaviour that [rule X].”62 In
section IV.E I shall get back to whether Hart is right about this, but this
has no bearing on the fact that we should read Ross’s norm-descriptive
propositions as propositional attitude reports on judges’ attitudes
towards legal norms.
Following Ross’s paraphrasing from norm-expressive to normdescriptive propositions, then, the doctrinal study of law is no longer a
study of how judges ought to behave in their capacity as judges (let
alone how ordinary citizens ought to behave). Just like Ellen’s father
who only speaks about how Ellen believes they ought to behave vis-àvis pixies, the Rossian legal realist only speaks about how judges
believe they ought to behave qua judges; about which rights and duties
they believe that they have (and hence, but only indirectly, which rights
and duties they believe that the citizens have). In Ross’s words:
A national law system, considered as a valid system of norms, can
accordingly be defined as the norms which actually are operative in
the mind of the judge, because they are felt by him to be socially
63
binding and therefore obeyed.

In his examples Ross is consistently careful to emphasise this
paraphrasing terminologically. Thus he writes “that every proposition
occurring in the doctrinal study of law contains as an integral part the
concept ‘valid (Illinois, California, common, etc.) law.’”64 This
phrasing emphasises that propositions of legal science must be
indexicalised: they must be propositions about the beliefs of a
particular group of people regarding a particular field; i.e., about the
60. See, e.g., Id. at 33, 52–53. Ross stresses that an additional aspect of these norms is
to “give rise to a reflex effect” in the general public and thus that they can also be said to be
(indirectly) directed at them. See, e.g., Id. at 52–54.
61. Id. at 16.
62. See Hart, Scandinavian Realism, supra note 4, at 238.
63. ROSS, supra note 9, at 35.
64. Id. at 11.
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beliefs of (Illinois, Californian, common, etc.) judges regarding
(Illinois, Californian, common, etc.) law.
This addition may
occasionally be tacitly implied but it can never be thought away
entirely—lest the propositional attitude context and hence the actual
possibility condition of legal knowledge disappear entirely. In other
words, adding “. . . is valid (Illinois, Californian, common, etc.) law” is
a way for the legal scholar to say “not my words” about the
epistemologically problematic directives. Instead, these words (plus
adhering beliefs/feelings) are carefully placed in the mouths (and
minds) of judges.65

We are obligated to
order the acceptor of a
negotiable instrument to
pay it according to the
tenor of his acceptance.

Figure 2. The relation between the judge’s norm-expressive and
the legal scientist’s norm-descriptive statement.
A. Sacrificing Empiricism?
Returning to the earlier mentioned worry as to the compatibility of
Ross’s general epistemological commitments with the details of his
theory, it might be objected that such propositions about judges’
convictions about rights and duties (in Ross’s words: about “the
ideology of the sources of law which in fact animates the courts”66) run

65. Ross does not refer to Frege on these issues but his writings are consistent
throughout with a full appreciation of Frege’s discovery. On the importance of reading
Ross’s work in this light and his statements of valid law as propositional attitude reports, see
Jakob v.H. Holtermann, Introduktion, in Om ret og retfærdighed : En indførelse i den
analytiske retsfilosofi (A. Ross ed. 2013); See also Holtermann, Naturalizing Alf Ross’s
Legal Realism: A Philosophical Reconstruction, supra note 5.
66. ROSS, supra note 9, at 76.
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into exactly the same kind of epistemological difficulties which
crippled natural law. After all, how do we know what people actually
believe or feel? This, it seems, is private too.
Ross does not deny the existence of epistemological difficulties in
this area. But in contrast to the difficulties facing natural law he does
not consider them fatal—for reasons that bear witness to the balanced
and moderate version of empiricism which he subscribes to at the end
of the day. Thus, Ross writes:
If, in spite of all, prediction is possible, it must be because the
mental process by which the judge decides to base his decision on
one rule rather than another is not a capricious and arbitrary matter,
varying from one judge to another, but a process determined by
attitudes and concepts, a common normative ideology, present and
active in the minds of judges when they act in their capacity as
judges. It is true that we cannot observe directly what takes place
in the mind of the judge, but it is possible to construct hypotheses
concerning it, and their value can be tested simply by observing
67
whether predictions based on them have come true.

Returning to the analogy, if Ellen believes in the existence of
duties toward Christmas pixies she will presumably behave accordingly
around Christmas: she will remind her father to buy rice in the super
market, to prepare it when they get home etc. And if a judge feels that
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, s. 62 is socially binding she
will behave accordingly if a case fulfilling the conditions specified in
that act is brought before her court: she will order the acceptor to pay.68
It is in view of these considerations that Ross’s theory of valid law
becomes a predictive theory: it becomes a set of predictions of judges’
behaviour under certain specified conditions based on their beliefs
about rules. Thus, in Ross’s final analysis an assertion A made in the
doctrinal study of law that a given directive D is valid (Illinois,
California, common, etc.) law, becomes:
. . . a prediction to the effect that if an action in which the
conditioning facts given in the section are considered to exist is
brought before the courts of this state, and if in the meantime there
have been no alterations in the circumstances which form the basis
of A, the directive to the judge contained in the section will form an

67. Id. at 75 (emphasis added). The Danish version contains an additional analogous
passage which is omitted from the English translation. See Ross, Om ret og retfærdighed :
En indførelse i den analytiske retsfilosofi, at 50. 1953.
68. This is also why Aarnio is wrong when he claims that “[t]his very element in the
Rossian prediction theory [that his theory is both behaviourist as well as idealist] necessarily
leads to a non-positivist final conclusion: The doctrinal study of law is interpretative, or if
preferred, hermeneutic, and not empirical as to its nature.” Aulis Aarnio, Legal Realism
Reinterpreted, in ESSAYS ON THE DOCTRINAL STUDY OF LAW 94 (Aulis Aarnio ed. 2011).
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And more generally, the entire doctrinal study of law becomes a
theory about “the aggregate of factors which exercise influence on the
judge’s formulation of the rule on which he bases his decision.”70
Ultimately, these factors can be subsumed under four sources of law:
legislation, precedent, custom, and the tradition of culture (“reason”).71
B. Dispensing with “Ought-Propositions” in the Analysis of Legal
Thinking?
Consider if we read Ross’s distinction between norm-expressive
and norm-descriptive utterances as covering the distinction between
(hypothetically) endorsing/accepting a given directive and making a
propositional attitude report concerning the cognitive relations certain
people (i.e. Illinois, California, common, etc. judges) hold to that
directive. Then, we see clearly why it is wrong when Hart claims that
Ross creates “the impression that what Kelsen terms ‘oughtpropositions’ may be dispensed with in the analysis of legal
thinking,”72 and when he claims that Ross does not “allow for the
internal non-factual, non-predictive uses of language inseparable from
the use of rules.”73 Properly understood, such propositions are not
dispensed with, nor are the non-predictive uses of such language not
allowed for. On the contrary, they survive wholly intact. In fact,
Ross’s analysis illustrates very clearly why such propositions are
literally indispensable in the analysis of legal thinking: without them
there would be no propositional attitude to report precisely because
such a report presupposes full awareness of the existence of “the
internal non-factual, non-predictive uses of language inseparable from
the use of rules,” viz. in the minds and mouths of the judges.
So Ross has no problem agreeing with Hart that “‘oughtpropositions’ and other forms of normative internal statements are both

69. ROSS, supra note 9, at 42.
70. Id. at 77.
71. See Id. at 75-107. This is also why validity, to Ross, becomes a matter of degree,
i.e. varying with the degree of probability with which it can be predicted that a given
directive will influence the judge’s reasoning process and hence her decision. See Id. At 4445. So also on this issue does Ross’s model for legal science imitate that of natural science,
where uncertainty and probability are widely recognized as the modalities of scientific
propositions. This is unlike Kelsen, who found this particular idea in Ross’s work
preposterous.
Cf. Hans Kelsen, Eine ‘Realistische’ und die Reine Rechtslehre.
Bemerkungen zu Alf Ross: On Law and Justice, 10 Österreichische Zeitschrift für
Öffentliches Recht (1959-60).
72. Hart, Scandinavian Realism, supra note 4, at 237.
73. Id. at 238.
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necessary and harmless in the analysis of legal thinking.”74 They are
necessary because without them Ross’s model for expressions of valid
law simply would not make sense.
Without the “oughtproposition”/directive there would be nothing for the propositional
attitude report to be about! And they are harmless because they are
embedded in the epistemologically safe propositional attitude context
which renders their alleged lack of truth value unproblematic.75
C. Misrepresenting “Valid Law” in the Mouths of Judges?
By the same token we see why Hart’s perhaps best known
objection to Ross is equally mistaken. Hart insists that “even if in the
mouth of the ordinary citizen or lawyer ‘this is a valid rule of English
law’ is a prediction of what a judge will do, say, and/or feel, this cannot
be its meaning in the mouth of a judge who is not engaged in predicting
his own or others’ behaviour or feelings.”76
First, we should notice that Ross does not claim that the above
analysis of the meaning of “valid law” matches perfectly with the
meaning of that term in ordinary usage—not among legal scholars,
judges or lawyers, nor among ordinary citizens. But unlike Hart, Ross
is clearly not interested in ordinary usage of this or any other legal
terms per se. His goal is epistemological, i.e. to show how the
doctrinal study of law can be possible as a science.77 Following this
precept, Ross’s definition of “valid law” is rather explicative in
Carnap’s sense78; it is a technical term serving the philosophical goals
which Ross is pursuing. And for that purpose, ordinary usage is no
guide, and the mere possibility of different meanings of the same term
cannot per se constitute a challenge.79
74. Id. at 239.
75. The same error is committed in MICHAEL D. A. FREEMAN, LLOYD’S
INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 1044 (8th ed. 2008); See also Joseph Raz, The Purity of
the Pure Theory of Law, in NORMATIVITY AND NORMS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
KELSENIAN THEMES 239 (Stanley L. Paulson & Bonnie Litschewski Paulson eds., Revised
Edition, 1998). Speaking, as Raz does, of “legal statements,” they can be both normative
and descriptive—or more accurately, they can be both norm-expressive and normdescriptive according to Ross. It is only the statements of legal science that have to be nonnormative, i.e. norm-descriptive.
76. Hart, Scandinavian Realism, supra note 4, at 237.
77. See Ross, supra note 9.
78. RUDOLF CARNAP, MEANING AND NECESSITY: A STUDY IN SEMANTICS AND
MODAL LOGIC, 7–8 (1947).
79. Unfortunately, this programmatic ambition on the part of Ross is completely
obscured in the current English translation. To illustrate, the following passage which in the
Danish edition states this ambition clearly lacks entirely the central words in the English
version (which I have added in brackets and underlined):
The foregoing analysis [of the concept of ‘valid Danish law’] has aimed at
interpreting the real content of propositions which [according to their meaning and
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But this does not mean that Ross cannot simultaneously recognise
the actual occurrence of other meanings in ordinary use—which he in
fact does.80 In particular, he acknowledges the widespread usage of
‘valid law’ in a meaning wholly different from the technical
portmanteau way of making propositional attitude reports elaborated
above.81 And in such contexts (for ease of expression we could call
this meaning “valid2”—as distinguished from “valid1” referring to the
specific kind of propositional attitude report described above) “valid
law” is used roughly as an analogue of “true” or “correct” and serves to
express the speakers endorsement or acceptance of a given legal
directive.
Of course, qua logical positivist Ross takes any such usage to be
ill-founded and unscientific but he unquestionably does recognise its
existence as a real legal phenomenon (reservations being made for
what Hart rightly describes as Ross’s “misplaced affection for the
battle-cry ‘meaningless’”, to which I shall return in the next section).
In fact, throughout On Law and Justice Ross repeatedly uses “valid
law” in this meaning of the word in order to characterise precisely the
(in his view) mistaken perception on the part of natural lawyers and
legal positivists as to the epistemological status of their propositions of
law.82
intention] have the character of [scientific] assertions that a certain rule is valid
Danish law.
Another question is the extent to which the doctrinal study of law in the form in
which it exists in current expositions of national law systems does in fact consist
of assertions of this kind. It is the question of the extent to which the doctrinal
study is and will be a cognition of [/a science about] valid law in the sense in
which it has been defined in the foregoing analysis.’ ROSS, supra note 9, at 45–
46.
For discussion of the unfortunate role played by the original English translation of
ON LAW AND JUSTICE and for a correct appreciation of this aspect of Ross’s
theory, see JAKOB V. H. HOLTERMANN, “THIS CANNOT BE ITS MEANING IN THE
MOUTH OF THE JUDGE”: THE CASE FOR THE NEW ENGLISH LANGUAGE
TRANSLATION OF ALF ROSS’S ON LAW AND JUSTICE FORTHCOMING ON OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS,, 20 Utopía y praxis latinoamericana : revista internacional de
filosofía iberoamericana y teoría social (2015).
80. Ross’s appreciation of the discrepancy between ordinary usage and his own
technical suggestion is also clearly expressed in Alf Ross, Book Review, 45 CAL. L. REV.
564, 568 (1957) (reviewing Hans Kelsen, WHAT IS JUSTICE? JUSTICE, LAW AND POLITICS
IN THE MIRROR OF SCIENCE: COLLECTED ESSAYS (1957); and in Danish in Alf Ross, Om
begrebet ‘gældende ret’ hos Theodor Geiger, 63 TIDSSKRIFT FOR RETTSVITENSKAP, at 247–
48 (1950).
81. See Ross, supra, at ix, 3, 18, 31, 38, 45, 52-70, 92, 95, 105, 155-156, 158, 160, 179,
229, 234, 238-239, 243, 248-249, 252, 263-264, 267, 275, 289, 291, 297-298, 300, 308, 311,
313, 316, 347, 352, 354, 366.
82. “He [the judge] wishes to find a decision that shall not be the fortuitous result of
mechanical manipulation of facts and paragraphs, but [. . .] something which is ‘valid.’”
ROSS, supra note 9, at 99; See also Id. at 53–54, 68, 274–75, 366–67.

2017]

A STRAWMAN REVISITED

23

Admittedly, the presence of this second kind of validity is more
easily overlooked in the English translation than in the Danish original,
because two related though different words are naturally available in
Danish to express this difference in meanings. Thus, in the English
edition the same term “valid law” is used as a translation both of
“gyldig ret” which connotes “correct”/ “true law,” and of “gældende
ret” which is closer in meaning to “law in effect”/ “law in force,” and
which Ross reserves for the particular kind of propositional attitude
report described above.83
In spite of linguistic shortcomings, it is nevertheless
understandable why Ross sounds somewhat nettled that Hart seems to
have read Ross as if only valid1 were recognised and present to the
exclusion of valid2. Thus, throughout On Law and Justice Ross
consistently places valid inside inverted commas when it is used in the
non-technical meaning of valid2, i.e. when it connotes “true”/
“correct.”84 And when the inverted commas are absent it is always
fairly obvious from the context which of the two is at play. Thus,
valid2 is reserved for contexts where the (according to Ross) mistaken
cognitivist interpretations of the “legal consciousness” are discussed.
Valid1, on the other hand, is consistently embedded in the formula: “. . .
is valid (Illinois, California, common, etc.) law,” indicating that Ross is
referring to the specific kind of propositional attitude report
characteristic (ideally) of the scientific study of law.
This clarification allows us to return to Hart’s objection that
Ross’s predictive definition of valid law “cannot be its meaning in the
mouth of a judge who is not engaged in predicting his own or others’
behaviour or feelings.”85 In The Concept of Law Hart specifies that the
challenge occurs precisely with regard to “how the judge’s own

83. The lack of clarity on this point is part of the motivation for the new translation and
second critical edition of ON LAW AND JUSTICE that is currently under preparation at Oxford
University Press (forthcoming 2017); See also Holtermann, Utopía y praxis latinoamericana
: revista internacional de filosofía iberoamericana y teoría social, (2015). For useful general
linguistic clarification, see Eng, supra note 6, at 198206. Interestingly, Weber emphasized
virtually the same distinction between two kinds of validity in R. Stammlers ‘Überwindung’
der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung, in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre
(Max Weber & Johannes Winckelmann eds., 1988/1907), and in the English translation of
that book Critique of Stammler (1977), one finds this distinction aptly expressed with the
two terms empirical and axiological validity for validity1 and validity2 respectively. See
Jakob v. H. Holtermann & Mikael Rask Madsen, European New Legal Realism and
International Law: How to Make International Law Intelligible, 28 LEIDEN J. OF INT'L L.
211, 216–20 (2015).
84. See Ross, supra note 9, at ix, 3, 18, 31, 53. 55. 57. 65. 68, 70, 92, 105, 158, 160,
179, 229, 263, 298, 308, 313, 366, 368, 370.
85. See Hart, Scandinavian Realism, supra note 4, at 237.
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statement that a particular rule is valid functions in judicial decision,”86
and in that particular situation it undeniably seems true that the judge is
not stating a prediction. Hart overlooks, however, that Ross does not
have to claim this. On the contrary, Ross can simply claim that the
meaning of “valid law” in the mouth of the judge who finds herself in
the specific situation Hart is referring to, is simply valid2, i.e. “correct”
or “true.”
In fact, Ross’s analysis of statements of valid law in terms of
propositional attitude reports can be said not only to leave conceptual
room for the use of valid2 but even to presuppose such usage. For, as
we have seen, this construction presupposes precisely a difference in
meaning between the embedded proposition and the full propositional
attitude report. In order for the legal scholar to “mean” (i.e. assert)
that: somebody (i.e. Illinois, California, common, etc. judges) feel that
D is socially binding (alternatively: accepts as a standard of behaviour
that D), which is the scientific meaning of “valid1,” she must
presuppose that there is somebody (i.e. Illinois, California, common,
etc. judges) that feels (and in that sense means) only that: D is thus
binding. Indeed, this is the very meaning of the propositional attitude
report! And one natural way for those judges to express that kind of
attitude toward D would be to say that “D is valid” in the meaning
valid2/“gyldig” i.e. is “true”/“correct.”
In other words, instead of this second meaning of valid law
contradicting Ross’s analysis as Hart claims it does, we see how it fits
perfectly into his analysis of valid law as part of the propositional
attitude report in the following way: a statement that: a given directive
D is valid1 (Illinois, Californian, common, etc.) law is, in effect, a
claim that: (Illinois, Californian, common, etc.) judges believe that D is
valid2, i.e. “correct” or “true” (and hence binding). In practice, of
course, Ross wishes to avoid this formulation and use of valid2
because, qua logical positivist, he believes that judges are wrong in so
believing but this is a different issue.
D. On Ross’s “Misplaced Affection for the Battle-Cry ‘Meaningless’”
Admittedly, this interpretation of Ross’s position is open to one
serious objection. Hart was undeniably right that Ross had a
“misplaced affection for the battle-cry ‘meaningless.’” Several places
in On Law and Justice (as elsewhere in Ross’s writings) expressions
like “valid” (i.e. valid2) and other normative words like “justice,”
“duty,”, “right”, “promise”, etc. and directives more generally are

86. HART, supra note 4, at 105 (emphasis added).
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triumphantly denounced as meaningless.87 And this fact seems not
only to contradict any claim that there is a second, more inclusive
meaning of validity at play in his work; it also seems to pinpoint an
inconsistency in his more technical use of the word validity because it
is not entirely clear how it is possible to hold any propositional attitude
(except perhaps bafflement!) towards a literally meaningless
proposition.88
In other words, by insisting to use the word meaningless to
describe all these traditional normative uses of language it does indeed
seem that Ross has de facto barred himself from the use of “oughtpropositions” in the analysis of legal thinking, and thus from the
possibility of sketching out in any real depth the phenomenology of the
internal aspect of legal rules.89 All that can be assigned to the judge’s
ideology, it seems, is indeed the abovementioned amorphous blob of
feelings of compulsion.
Again, however, I submit that the problem is only superficial; it
disappears once we recognise the presence also of two meanings of
meaning in his text. On the one hand, Ross obviously adopts the
austere logico-positivist usage where meaningful/meaningless mean
simply verifiable/unverifiable respectively. And this is undoubtedly
the meaning (correspondingly, we could call this meaning1) which
Ross applies whenever he invokes “the battle-cry of “meaningless.’”
But on the other hand there is simultaneously a much more
commonsensical concept of meaning at play in his writings; a meaning
(~meaning2) that is much broader and more inclusive and which
accepts as meaningful the same kinds of propositions as would almost
any competent language user. And this is precisely the meaning of
meaning which Ross applies whenever he describes the
phenomenology of the “internal aspect,” i.e. of the judicial ideology
which is found when the legal scholar applies the introspective method.
Because this entire ideology is indeed one of meaning:
Thus the norms of chess are the abstract idea content (of a directive
nature) which makes it possible, as a scheme of interpretation, to
understand the phenomena of chess (the actions of the moves and
the experienced patterns of action) as a coherent whole of meaning
87. See, e.g., Ross supra note 9, at 172, 174, 220, 249, 286. See also, e.g., Ross, Tû-Tû,
70 Harvard Law Review 812 (1957).
88. This challenge could be considered a version of the so-called Frege-Geach
problem. See P.T. Geach, Assertion, THE PHIL. REV. 74 (1965). In ongoing work I am
looking more closely at this aspect.
89. Phenomenology is used here in the sense of the study/theory of structures of
consciousness as experienced from the first-person perspective. See, e.g., David Woodruff
Smith, Gottlob Frege, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed.
2016).
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Correspondingly, Ross manifestly ascribes meaning even to
directives that are not actually expressed (much less placed in
propositional attitude contexts) but considered purely in abstraction:
It is possible to abstract the meaning of an assertion purely as a
thought content (‘2 and 2 make 4’) from the apprehension of the
same by a given person at a given time; and in just the same way it
is possible to abstract the meaning of a directive (‘the king has the
power of moving one square in any direction’) from the concrete
experience of the directive. The concept ‘rule of chess’ must
therefore in accurate analysis be divided into two: the experienced
ideas of certain patterns of behaviour (with the accompanying
emotions) and the abstract content of those ideas, the norms of
91
chess.

If only the narrow ‘logical positivist’92 conception of meaning
(meaning1) was at play, these claims would be senseless. Their overt
presence is a sign therefore not of a contradiction at the heart of Ross’s
theory, but rather of the undogmatic character of his epistemological
and semantic theory which leaves ample room also for a less technical
concept of meaning alongside the more technical logico-positivist
one.93 It is indeed true that he uses meaningless exactly as a battle-cry.
And his affection for this battle-cry is indeed misplaced. But this is not
because Ross unjustly tries to define what is thus rendered
“meaningless” out of existence.94 It is misplaced rather because in
using it as a technical term signifying simply unjustifiability (more
accurately: the lacking of truth value), Ross confounds things that
ought to be kept apart, and in so doing, he gives sceptical readers an
excuse to overlook the presence of a considerably less austere and
fairly commonsensical concept of meaning and, hence, for
misconstruing his theory.

90. ROSS, supra note 9, at 16 (emphasis added). Numerous passages to the same
effect, see, e.g., Id. at 12–13, 32, 74.
91. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). This simultaneously illustrates the substantive
movement in Ross’s thinking, because in 1936 he took the exact opposite view and flatly
denied that any abstract meaningfulness could be ascribed to normative propositions. See
Ross, The 25th Anniversary of the Pure Theory of Law, supra note 24, at 249. In other
words, his earlier (anti-)semantics for normative propositions rendered conceptually
impossible the Fregean move we find in On Law and Justice.
92. I place logical positivist in inverted commas here for reasons that will be clear
immediately below.
93. Ross’s awareness of the technical or artificial character of the narrow concept of
meaning as verification criteria is further emphasized by the fact that he sometimes refers to
this kind of meaning as representative or logical meaning. See, e.g., ROSS, supra note 9, at
8.
94. See HART, supra note 4, at 91.
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One might object to this interpretation that it makes Ross emerge
as a confused and self-contradictory writer. To state that he operated
with two meanings of “meaning” could make him appear like someone
who, when push comes to shove, cannot stick to his logical positivist
principles—or just as someone who is not philosophically rigorous.95
We should, however, remind ourselves that logical positivism as a
movement was never completely uniform. Especially from the early
1930s onwards, the circle was divided precisely over the conception of
meaning.96 Thus, a “conservative camp” organized around Moritz
Schlick insisted on an uncompromising line sticking to a strict
empiricist verificationist conception of meaning thus expelling
everything unverifiable from the realm of meaning.97 However, a socalled left wing organized around Otto Neurath and Rudolph Carnap
took a more liberal approach. Not only did they relax the verification
principle in order to include so-called laws of nature (by definition
extending beyond empirical observation) among statements that are
verifiable and thus meaningful and potentially scientific. They also
admitted that statements that notoriously cannot honor even this
relaxed notion of meaningful statements (so-called “metaphysical”
statements, including normative—norm-expressive—statements), were
not strictly speaking meaningless.98 They were only cognitively or
empirically meaningless. In other words, these left-wing members
would, just like Ross, accept a distinction within the realm of the
meaningful between the empirically or cognitively meaningful and
other kinds of meaningful—although they would still banish the latter
group from science and assign them to “metaphysics”. (Liberal/left
wing or not, they were after all still logical positivists.)99
These considerations make clear what the unfortunate
combination of Ross’s belligerent rhetoric and Hart’s uncharitable
reading has managed to keep hidden for half a century: it is one thing
to claim that normative and more generally metaphysical beliefs cannot
be true or false; it is another thing altogether to claim that such beliefs
are literally meaningless, and that we therefore live in a universe
devoid of people holding them. Ross obviously held the former view,
95. I am grateful to Dan Priel for pushing me on this point.
96. For a first-hand description of this debate, see Rudolf Carnap, Intellectual
Autobiography, in The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap 3–86 (Paul Arthur Schilpp, ed. 1963).
97. Id. at 57-58.
98. Id. at 57-59.
99. Placing Ross within logical positivism’s left wing on this issue is further justified
by the fact that Ross from 1934 onwards had an extensive correspondence with Neurath.
The contents of this correspondence confirms that Neurath’s specific interpretation of
logical positivism had a very substantive impact on Ross’s legal realism. Jens Evald, Alf
Ross - a life (DJØF Publishing. 2014).
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but we now see that he did not hold the latter.
E. Accepting Social Rules vs. Feeling that they are Socially Binding
One remaining question is whether Hart was nevertheless right
that theoretical differences remain between his critical reflective
attitude characteristic of the internal aspect of rules and Ross’s
“feelings of being bound.”
We should note that unless Hart has some highly technical notions
in mind he cannot consistently deny the existence of a necessary
connection between the internal aspect and some kind of “feelings” or
“experiences.” As is clear from his criticism of the identification of
rules with habits Hart is certainly no behaviourist. A group of zombies
cannot have rules on his account, no matter how well versed in
normative lingo. We see this, e.g., from the core passage of The
Concept of Law where Hart discusses the relationship between the
internal aspect of rules and feelings. Here, he specifically does not
identify this aspect with “criticism (including self-criticism), demands
for conformity, [and with] acknowledgement that such criticism and
demands are justified.”100 Instead, Hart states how this necessary
attitudinal element of the internal aspect displays itself thus.
Correspondingly, the critical reflective attitude does not consist in the
use of “the normative terminology of ‘ought,’ ‘must,’ and ‘should,’
‘right’ and ‘wrong,’” but finds its characteristic expression thus.101
It is hard to see what it could possibly be that displays itself, or
finds its characteristic expression thus, if not some kind of
psychological states among the members of the group. Any attempt at
an anti-mentalistic definition of acceptance and of the critical reflective
attitude strictly in terms of use would arguably jeopardise Hart’s entire
attempt to distinguish between following social rules and merely
having convergent behaviour. Verbal behaviour is also a kind of
behaviour, and as such it can be studied purely from the outside. We
would therefore find no use for a distinct internal point of view. So it
seems that Hart after all is no Wittgenstein on matters of the mental.
His internal aspect has to have an “inside,” there has to be a way that it
“feels.”102
This allows us to restate Hart’s objection more precisely: the
problem with Ross’s account cannot simply be that it is
phenomenological; it has to be that it is phenomenologically incorrect.
100. HART, supra note 4, at 57.
101. Id. The same point can be seen indirectly from the fact that Hart acknowledges the
theoretical possibility that otherwise perfect normative linguistic behaviour may in fact be
“pretence” or “window dressing.” Id. at 140.
102. At least for the majority. Id. at 56.

2017]

A STRAWMAN REVISITED

29

So we have to look more specifically for a principled difference
between Hart’s critical reflective attitude and the particular kind of
feeling which Ross assigns to the judge. And on this approach, Hart’s
critical reflective attitude has at least three key features which might
distinguish it from Ross’s “binding feelings.”
First, the critical reflective attitude is social in that the attitudinist
holds that the rule as a common public standard binds all members of
the social group and herself merely qua such member. This contrasts
with the merely individual “psychological experiences analogues to
those of restriction or compulsion”103 to which group members might
refer “when they say they ‘feel bound’ to behave in certain ways.”104
Second, instead of “feeling compelled” by the rule the
attitudinist’s acceptance of it is in some sense a matter of free
deliberation. This is also what MacCormick refers to as the volitional
element of the internal aspect.105
Third, the critical reflective attitude is a cognizance. That is to
say, the attitudinist takes this social character to consist in or stem from
the intersubjective verifiability or justifiability of the rule in question.
Hart consistently casts his descriptions of the critical reflective attitude
in epistemic terms. He emphasises how the attitudinist “treat[s]
deviations as a reason for such [adverse] reaction and demands for
conformity as justified,”106 and how the attitudinist has to “think of his
conforming behaviour as ‘right,’ ‘correct,’ or ‘obligatory.’”107 The
attitudinist does not merely irrationally “feel” that one should conform
to the standard; he “knows” it, or “has the right to be certain.”
We may appreciate the contrast Hart is making here. The problem
is again, however, that the account with which he contrasts his own has
very little in common with the view actually propounded by Ross. On
the contrary, in terms of characterising the phenomenology of
following rules, Ross was substantially in agreement with and thus
effectively preceded Hart on all three points.
As to the first of these points (i.e. the social character of the
critical reflective attitude) it is quite clear from Ross’s central chess
analogy that he does not consider the internal, or in his terminology the
ideological aspect of legal rules, to be merely a matter of individual

103. Id. at 57.
104. Id.; See also Hart, Scandinavian Realism, supra note 4, at 238. Relatedly, Hart
warns against regarding the rule of recognition not as a public, common standard of correct
judicial decision, but as something which each judge merely obeys for his part only. HART,
supra note 4, at 115–16.
105. NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART, 47–48 (2d ed. 2008).
106. HART, supra note 4, at 238.
107. Id. at 115; See also Id. at 11, 55, 84, 90, 105, 140.
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feelings which just happen to coincide among a majority of judges in a
given jurisdiction. Instead, he emphasises precisely the constitutive
character of the social element:
[F]ellowship is an essential factor in a game of chess. [. . .] [T]he
aims and interests pursued and the actions conditioned by these can
only be conceived of as a link in a greater whole which include the
actions of another person. [. . .]
Fellowship is also revealed in the intersubjective character of the
rules of chess. It is essential that they should be given the same
interpretation, at least by the two players in a given game.
Otherwise there would be no game, and the separate moves would
108
remain in isolation with no coherent meaning.

Furthermore, Ross is quite eager to emphasise that the relevant
“binding feeling” is precisely not a merely individual feeling of
compulsion—and for virtually the same reasons as Hart:
These directives are felt by each player to be socially binding; that
is to say, a player not only feels himself spontaneously motivated
(‘bound’) to a certain method of action but is at the same time
certain that a breach of the rules will call forth a reaction (protest)
109
on the part of his opponent.

This essentially social character of the relevant attitude also has a
bearing on the second alleged point of contrast (i.e. on the distinction
between compulsion and free deliberation), because it makes clear that
Ross is not dealing with immediate feelings of compulsion but with
only mediately binding feelings. Furthermore, we should note that
Ross rarely speaks literally of compulsion and only in contexts where
he is stressing the emotional and hence irrational and unverifiable)
character of judges’ beliefs.110 Elsewhere, he writes e.g. “the legal
consciousness is, like the sense of morality, a disinterested attitude of
approval or disapproval toward a social norm.”111 The judge is
“motivated by disinterested impulses”112 or by “a normative ideology
of a known content,”113 and he describes the judge as a “a human being
who will carefully attend to his social task by making decisions which
he feels to be ‘right’ in the spirit of the legal and cultural tradition.”114
These passages are considerably closer to the terminology

108. ROSS, supra note 9, at 131.
109. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 16 – where Ross speaks only indirectly about judges through the analogy of
chess players.
111. Id. at 369 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 53.
113. Id. at 74.
114. ROSS, supra note 9, at 131 (emphasis added).
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preferred by Hart, and they arguably make it more difficult to uphold
the image of the relevant Rossian feelings as unconditional all-ornothing compulsive states which obsessively dominate the judge’s
mind and force her to reach a particular decision. On the contrary,
Ross explicitly states in his canonical formulation of the predictive
theory that a given rule’s being valid (i.e. that judges “feel bound” by
it) means only that if the relevant pattern of behaviour is considered to
exist in a case brought before the court, that rule “will form an integral
part of the reasoning underlying the judgment.”115 In other words, the
relevant feeling, the propositional attitude toward the individual legal
rule, is one which allows of degrees: the attitude manifests itself in a
pull in the judge’s comprehensive motivational structure but this pull
may in individual cases be counterweighed or deflected by stronger
pulls exerted by other rules which the judge also feels socially bound
by, i.e. thinks are valid2.116
Finally, on this second alleged point of contrast it seems that Hart
too has to include some kind of bindingness in the rules. If the critical
reflective attitude is characterised by the attitudinist thinking “of his
conforming behaviour as ‘right,’ ‘correct,’ or ‘obligatory,’”117 it is
arguably hard to see how anyone can have such an attitude and still
consider herself absolutely free to decide whether to conform or not.118
To be sure, this force that binds the attitudinist is not literally
compelling, but neither was, as we saw, the force which Ross
countenanced (hence also inverted commas: “bound”).
This brings us to the third of the alleged points of difference (i.e.
the epistemic aspect of Hart’s critical reflective attitude). For as it
turns out, the kind of binding force which Hart thus has to admit the
existence of (and which—together with the more relaxed understanding
of Ross’s bindingness—undermines the picture of a sharp contrast
between free and compulsive accounts of the internal aspect), stems
precisely from this epistemic aspect. The attitudinist feels “forced” to
conform, i.e. considers a certain pattern of behaviour obligatory,
precisely because she accepts a certain set of reasons which justify the
rule. In other words, she considers the rule “binding” in the same
rather puzzling way in which we generally consider binding the

115. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
116. In this respect (though of course not in others), Rossian rules are a lot like
Dworkinean principles.
117. HART, supra note 4, at 115.
118. In fact, Ross already stressed this exact point in his review of Hart. See Ross,
Review of H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, supra note 10, at 1188; See also
MACCORMICK, supra note 105, at 48; See also Brian Leiter, The Demarcation Problem in
Jurisprudence: A New Case for Scepticism, 31 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 663, 672 (2011).
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conclusion of a valid argument with true premises.
Mindful of Ross’s criticism of natural law style cognitivism we
might try, then, to restate the difference between the two relevant
attitudes: they may both be social and they may both be considered
binding only in a guarded or metaphorical sense, but could it be that
Ross, unlike Hart, cannot countenance for the epistemic aspect
characteristic of the internal aspect of rules?
Thus stated, however, the objection overlooks that in spite of
Ross’s norm-skepticism he actually also characterises the judicial
propositional attitude as a kind of cognizance. We already saw that
Ross too thinks that the judge will try to make “decisions which he
feels to be ‘right’ in the spirit of the legal and cultural tradition.”119 He
too thinks that the judge “wishes to find a decision … which is ‘valid’
[valid2].”120 And just like Hart, Ross thinks that if a judge considers a
legal rule valid (valid2) it implies that the judge apply the rule “as an
integral part of the reasoning underlying the judgement,”121 i.e., as a
premise in an argument claiming to justify a particular legal
decision!122
In other words, there can be little doubt that Ross considers the
relevant propositional attitude epistemic in more or less the same way
Hart does, i.e. as a cognizance. It might be objected that this
contradicts Ross’s more general norm-skepticism, but this confounds
epistemological and phenomenological levels of the discussion. A
gambler who holds that the preceding series of ten consecutive blacks
on the roulette has increased her chances of winning the next bet on red
obviously takes this belief to be correct. If challenged she will
presumably cite the preceding series as her reason for holding it, as its
justification. Qua attitude, then, this belief is indistinguishable from
that of the gambler next to her who unlike her thinks that the
probability of red winning next is left unaffected by the preceding
series. She too will take her particular belief to be correct, and if
challenged she too will cite particular beliefs as her reason for holding
it; as its justification. To be sure, she will cite different (and
presumably better) reasons, but this has no bearing on her attitude qua
attitude. Both gamblers, it seems, take their respective beliefs to be
correct and “socially binding” in the same way; that is, they consider
its correctness a matter not of their individual thoughts or feelings but
of its intersubjective justifiability. The difference, then, is a fact, not of

119.
120.
121.
122.

ROSS, supra note 9, at 138.
Id. at 99.
See Id. at 42.
See Id. at 62, 283–84.

2017]

A STRAWMAN REVISITED

33

the attitude but of its actual justifiability. The difference is not
phenomenological but epistemological.
This example illustrates more generally the importance of
separating questions regarding perceived justifiability from questions
regarding actual justifiability. It tells us that we do not, in order to
determine whether a given propositional attitude is epistemic, i.e.
whether the person who holds it takes the proposition to be justifiable,
have to establish that that proposition is in fact also justifiable. On the
contrary, it is perfectly possible to express scepticism with regard to the
actual justifiability of given beliefs while simultaneously fully
recognising the presence of contrary beliefs in other people. This was
precisely what Ross did when he described how the judge tries to make
“decisions which he feels to be ‘right’ . . .”123
In fact, this last point is just to repeat and reapply the distinction
between norm-expression and norm-description, and thus to show that
Frege’s insight described above as to the truth-condition transforming
capabilities of propositional attitude reports holds good also with
regard to epistemic attitudes.
CONCLUSION—AND BEYOND: ON THE REAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
ROSS’S LEGAL REALISM AND HART’S LEGAL POSITIVISM
By now it should be clear that Ross did not make any of the
mistakes Hart accused him of. First of all, Ross did not overlook the
internal aspect of legal rules. On the contrary, under the heading “a
coherent whole of meaning and motivation,” Ross was completely
aware of its existence and repeatedly stressed the need for an
“introspective method” in order to capture it. And in spite of Hart’s
claim to the opposite Ross did not misconstrue this internal aspect
either. On the contrary, he gave a full and, if anything, even richer
phenomenological analysis of it than did Hart.124 In other words, by
portraying the rich phenomenology of Ross’s account of the judge’s
normative ideology as just one big un-analysable blob of “feelings of
compulsion,” Hart in effect committed a straw man fallacy.
But this raises a final question as to the more general upshot of
this entire discussion. What are the broader implications of these
conclusions for our understanding of the theoretical relationship
between the legal philosophies espoused by Ross and Hart
respectively? And what are or what should be the implications more
generally for our understanding of the theoretical relationship between
legal realism and legal positivism?
123. Id. at 138.
124. Eng, supra note 6, at 231.
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One natural option, perhaps, would be to conclude that Ross and
Hart were actually in agreement on fundamentals. If Ross did not
make any of the mistakes Hart accused him of, it could seem natural to
conclude that they were really in agreement. In effect, this was the
conclusion drawn by Eng in his recent study of the exchanges between
Ross and Hart. Here Eng concluded that “Hart’s method . . . is also
Ross’s method . . .,”125 that any perception of a “theoretical gulf”
between the two “is deceptive.”126
On this reading, then, the primary result of setting the record
straight is a minor correction to that long chapter in the history of 20th
century legal philosophy dealing with Hart’s enormous influence. This
chapter currently hails Hart for accomplishing a substantial
methodological breakthrough to jurisprudence precisely through his
introduction of the distinction between the internal and external aspects
of social rules. To the extent the general conclusion to the foregoing
discussion is that Ross and Hart were actually in agreement, the only
upshot of it, then, would seem to be that contrary to widespread belief
we in fact have a dual starting point for this important invention. The
discussion would not, however, have any deeper theoretical impact.
Legal philosophy would be able to proceed undisturbed down the path
it had already been moving since it (or some significant subset of it)
decided to follow “Hart’s method.” Only it would of course now in all
decency have to admit that it was in fact following “Ross’s and Hart’s
method”—and that it could have begun its journey a few years earlier
had it not misunderstood Ross.
Correspondingly in the broader theoretical landscape, if we take
Ross and Hart as paradigmatic proponents of legal realism and legal
positivism respectively, we would seem to end up with a blurring of
any sharp boundary between legal realism and legal positivism. By
revealing these actual theoretical alignments, we would of course have
to redraw our general theoretical map quite considerably, but besides a
regained access to the more detailed insights of Ross’s work the
rehabilitation of him (and potentially of other Scandinavians) would
not imply any genuinely new jurisprudential insights.
I believe however that this conclusion would be wrong. Indeed I
submit that we should draw the opposite conclusion: setting the record
straight regarding Ross’s actual position makes us realize how he and
Hart in fact remain in profound disagreement—primarily because even
though Hart did to a great extent misrepresent Ross’s theory and in fact
overtook or repeated central parts of it, he never fully appreciated
125. Id. at 222.
126. Id. at 241.
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Ross’s most valuable and important insights.
To be sure, any such fundamental disagreement lies not in their
respective phenomenological descriptions of the internal aspect per se.
In terms of phenomenology I see no crucial differences between
them—as witnessed by the whole argument so far. But Hart’s
importance is usually ascribed, not so much to his alleged discovery of
the internal aspect, but to the methodological conclusions he has been
taken to draw on that background. And the crucial difference between
Hart and Ross lies precisely in the methodological conclusions they
each draw from this. Or fail to draw. One of the benefits of exposing
the deficiencies of Hart’s criticism of Ross is that it allows us to see the
shortcomings of Hart’s theory more clearly. Through the prism of
Hart’s mistaken criticism and against the backdrop of the clear and
principled position actually held by Ross we see first of all how
underdeveloped Hart’s theory really is in terms of method. Secondly,
insofar that a coherent position on method can be reconstructed, we see
also how unoriginal it comes out and how closely it resembles
Kelsen’s version of legal positivism. In other words—and contra
Eng—the preceding study of Hart’s mistaken criticism of Ross allows
us to reassert more clearly the categorical difference between legal
realism and legal positivism.
To see this we should first recapitulate the two key
methodological insights of Ross’s theory, and then compare where Hart
stands on each of these issues. As we have seen Ross consistently
observed two logically distinct theoretical distinctions. First of all he
urged us to abandon behaviourism and to apply an introspective
method. The scientific study of legal rules is possible, Ross claimed,
only “through ideological interpretation, that is, by means of the
hypothesis of a certain ideology which animates the judge and
motivates his actions.”127 In this literal sense legal science has to be
internal (~internal1).
But by insisting that the propositions of legal science be normdescriptive, not norm-expressive, Ross also issued a methodological
imperative with regard to a completely different internal-external
divide, i.e. the one between directly expressing normative propositions
(~internal2) and making propositional attitude reports about such
propositions (~external2). Introspection does not imply or necessitate
adoption of the introspected point of view. The legal scientist’s
propositions about the existence of legal rules have to be propositional
attitude reports (although the propositions of judges and lawyers
obviously need not). In this metaphorical sense, Ross’s method is
127. ROSS, supra note 9, at 37.
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external because the legal scientist has to stay on the ‘outside’ of the
propositional attitude context. Qua scientist she is prohibited—for
epistemological reasons—from adopting those same attitudes and from
making (in whatever guarded/hypothetical way) those same statements.
Instead, her job consists entirely of observing and stating the fact that
somebody else (i.e. California, Illinois, common law etc. judges) have
adopted the relevant kind of propositional attitude toward certain rules.
So to sum up, Ross’s dual methodological advice in On Law and
Justice is that legal science should be simultaneously internal1 and
external2. By contrast, and this is my critical claim, the sum of
methodological wisdom found in Hart’s work amounts only to one
explicit advice: don’t be behaviourist! In other words: be internal1!
Beyond correctly replicating (and oft repeating) this valuable insight, it
is simply very hard to find an indication in The Concept of Law of
Hart’s awareness of the existence—let alone the methodological
importance—of an additional internal-external distinction along the
lines observed by Ross. And, insofar that it is possible to reconstruct a
view indirectly from the scarce textual evidence, I submit that Hart’s
methodological stance is that legal science should stay on the internal
side also of this particular second kind of the internal-external divide,
i.e. stay internal2!
This may sound somewhat surprising considering the legacy of
Hart’s legal philosophy. After all, his version of legal positivism has
been hailed by several theorists precisely for showing a “third way”
between austere behaviourism and natural law. MacCormick expresses
this sentiment well:
The ‘external point of view’ is not necessarily that of an outsider to
the group. In its ‘extreme’ form it comprehends the point of view of
all those who, whether from ignorance of agents’ subjective
meanings or from scientific commitment, are restricted or restrict
themselves to observation of human behavioural regularity. This
viewpoint is distinct from Hart’s ‘non-extreme external point of
view.’ I called that the ‘hermeneutic point of view,’ because it is
the viewpoint of one who, without (or in scientific abstraction
from) any volitional commitment of his own, seeks to understand,
portray, or describe human activity as it is meaningful ‘from the
internal point of view.’ Such a one shares in the cognitive element
of that latter point of view and gives full cognitive recognition to
and appreciation of the latter’s volitional element. Thus she can
understand rules and standards for what they are, but does not
endorse them for her part in stating or describing them or
discussing their correct application. This ‘hermeneutic point of
view’ is in fact the viewpoint implicitly ascribed to and used by the
legal theorist, scholar, or writer who follows Hart’s method
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It is first and foremost this hermeneutic or non-extreme external
point of view which has earned Hart his reputation for methodological
sophistication. Several legal philosophers emphasise not merely Hart’s
renunciation of behaviourism but rather his outlining of such a third
point of view, which is external and yet distinct from the “extreme
external point of view.”129 And when Eng claimed that “Hart’s method
[. . .] is also Ross’s method”130 he referred precisely to this passage
from MacCormick.
Carving out such a moderate or non-extreme external point of
view is attractive because it holds the promise of saving modern legal
positivism from the scientistic excesses of its earlier versions without
simultaneously losing the school’s distinctiveness from natural law.
And judging from MacCormick’s description cited above one might
find that Hart’s non-extreme external point of view has sufficient
similarities with Ross’s dual internal1 & external2 approach to make at
least prima facie plausible Eng’s claim that Hart’s method is also
Ross’s method.
To be sure, most theorists admit that Hart was in fact rather vague
on this issue. But they nevertheless assert that the third point of view
must somehow be present as a tacit premise and they infer this more
generally from Hart’s adherence to legal positivism and to meta-ethical
non-cognitivism.131 In a characteristic passage, MacCormick thus
writes:
If there is any point which seems to capture that which the Hartian
legal theorist as such must hold, it is surely this ‘nonextreme
external point of view’ [. . .] He does, after all, describe himself as
a legal positivist, taking as his ground for that the proposition that
understanding a law or a legal system in its character as such is a
matter quite independent of one’s own moral or other commitment
132
to upholding that law or legal system.

Correspondingly Eng maintains that Hart’s mistaken reading of
Ross is explained by Hart’s “being lost in the Hartian system,”133 i.e.
that the whole structure including the “third point of view” must have
128. MACCORMICK, supra note 105, at 59 (first emphasis added).
129. In addition to MacCormick as quoted immediately above and Eng as quoted
immediately below, this tendency is exemplified, e.g., in Shapiro, supra note 6, at 11581160, and Kevin Toh, Hart’s Expressivism and his Benthamite Project, 11 Legal Theory 85
(2005).
130. Eng, supra note 6, at 222.
131. Besides MacCormick and Eng as illustrated immediately below, see, e.g., Toh,
supra note 129, at 82.
132. MACCORMICK, supra note 105, at 52 (emphasis added).
133. Eng, supra note 6, at 196 (emphasis added).
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been tacitly present in The Concept of Law all along.
However, three points render this reading problematic. First, it is
simply very hard to find solid textual evidence for a third non-extreme
external point of view in The Concept of Law. In fact, Hart admitted
later in his career that he had not originally thought of any further
distinctions besides internal1/external1 points of view, and he even
expressed regret that he had overlooked the important, related
distinction the between committed and detached normative statements
later developed by Joseph Raz.134 Furthermore, Hart applauded this
theoretical invention as a welcome opportunity to clarify his own
theory praising the detached normative statements for creating the
logical space to make sense of the difference between legal positivism
and natural law.135
Second, in terms of methodological innovation this seems to
merely bring Hart right back into mainstream legal positivism! Raz
originally developed this distinction to make sense of Kelsen’s
somewhat enigmatic claims about “ought-statements” in legal
science.136 Hart was in fact very well aware of this link to Kelsen, and
he emphasised how the concept of detached normative statements was
for him the key to finally making sense of Kelsen’s theory about
“ought-statements” and to see the deep commonalities with his own
theory.137 In other words, if we equate Hart’s method with the making,
from a non-extreme external point of view, of such detached normative
statements it turns out that Hart’s method is for all practical purposes
also Kelsen’s method.
Third, whereas Hart is probably right in thinking that the
distinction between detached and committed normative statements can
consistently be added to his analysis of valid law, it should be strongly
emphasised that detached statements nevertheless remain categorically
different from the so-called norm-descriptive statements which Ross
insists should be the cornerstone of legal science—and hence, that a
deep theoretical gulf between Hart’s/Kelsen’s legal positivist method
and Ross’s legal realist method remain.
This is so because detached normative statements about valid
law—as defined by Raz and later adopted by Hart—simply are not

134. See, H. L. A. Hart, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
POLITICAL THEORY 154-155 (1982), and Hart, supra note 8, at 14-15, both places referring
to JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 146–62
(1979).
135. See H. L. A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM, supra note 134, 154–55 (1982); See also
HART, supra note 8, at 14–15.
136. Raz, supra note 134, at 146–62.
137. Hart, supra note 8, at 15.
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statements about any social-psychological fact! In Raz’s words:
It is important not to confuse such statements from a point of view
with statements about other people’s beliefs. One reason is that
there may be no one who has such a belief. The friend in our
example may be expressing a very uncommon view on an obscure
point of Rabbinical law. Indeed Rabbinical law may never have
been endorsed or practiced by anybody, not even the enquiring
138
Jew.

On the contrary, such detached normative statements are
immediately norm-expressive in Ross’s sense:
Nor can such statements be interpreted as conditionals: ‘If you
accept this point of view then you should etc.’ Rather they assert
what is the case from the relevant point of view as if it is valid or
on the hypothesis that it is—as Kelsen expresses the point—but
139
without actually endorsing it.

This immediately norm-expressive and hence clearly nonpropositional attitude reporting character of the detached normative
statements coincides very well with the analysis of validity generally
offered in The Concept of Law. First of all, Hart’s truth conditions for
statements about valid law are plainly very different from propositional
attitude reports: “it is plain that there is no necessary connection
between the validity of any particular rule and its efficacy . . .”140
Instead they rely on a verification procedure where valid law is
conceived as any normative conclusion arrived at through a valid chain
of inter-normative reasoning from a given foundational norm:
To say that a given rule is valid is to recognize it as passing all the
tests provided by the rule of recognition and so as a rule of the
system. We can indeed simply say that the statement that a
particular rule is valid means that it satisfies all the criteria
141
provided by the rule of recognition.

At the same time this of course reminds us that there is one very
well-known exception to this claim that Hart’s theory does not contain
propositional attitude reports in the Rossian sense. And this exception
has to do with the validity of the foundational legal rule of a given legal
system; the rule of recognition. To Hart the validity of this particular
rule can only be established in the following kind of propositional
attitude report: “In England they recognize as law. . . whatever the
Queen in parliament enacts.”142
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Raz, supra note 134, at 156–57.
Id. at 157 (emphasis added).
Hart, supra note 4, at 103.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 102.
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It would however be a grave mistake to think that this particular
similarity could somehow bridge the theoretical divide between Ross
and Hart. First of all, even Kelsen in his own way agrees that the
validity of the basic norm of a legal system cannot be determined
completely in ought-terms.143 He too insists that it presupposes at the
very least the effectiveness of that norm.144 And not many legal
philosophers would for that reason claim that Kelsen and Ross were
ultimately in agreement.145 Second, Hart’s particular example (“In
England they. . .”) is not a detached normative statement simply
because it is not a statement from a point of view in the sense defined
by Raz.146 Finally, we would do well to remember that Hart’s rule of
recognition is exceptional in his comprehensive theory of valid law
(like Kelsen’s basic norm is in his theory). The rule of recognition is
thus the only rule whose validity can be established thus. For all other
legal rules (all the primary rules) they can simply not, as we have seen,
be construed as Rossian style statements about anybody’s beliefs; their
validity is determined in a completely different, non-empirical manner,
i.e. through a complex inter-normative chain of reasoning. As Hart
states: “It is of course common for a jurist expounding the law of some
system to do so in the form of detached normative statements.”147
Thus, more or less all propositions produced at ordinary law
faculties—in tort law, EU-law, contract law, etc.—should, according to
Hart, have the character of such detached normative statements. The
legal scientist’s statements should in all these areas be (detached)
norm-expressive; not norm-descriptive.
Based on these considerations, I think it is fair to conclude that
Eng is wrong when he claims that Hart’s method is also Ross’s
method. On the contrary, the fundamental difference between their
respective methods is clear: For Hart (as for Kelsen), once the rule of
recognition (/the basic norm) has been identified empirically, legal
science proceeds by making (detached) norm-expressive statements
about valid primary rules. It is thus a discipline in norms, i.e. a
discipline that expresses normative conclusions on the basis of
complex inter-normative inferences.
This in contrast with Ross according to whom legal science shall

143. See, Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, 118-121 (3d ed. 2009).
144. Id.
145. Indeed, both Kelsen and Ross vehemently denied this. See Kelsen, Österreichische
Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht, (1959-60); see, e.g., Ross, Validity and the Conflict
Between Legal Positivism and Natural Law, supra note 10.
146. One such detached statement can in fact also be made about the rule of recognition:
“Whatever the parliament enacts is law.”
147. Hart, Essays on Bentham, supra note 134, at 154.
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only make norm-descriptive assertions, i.e. propositional attitude
reports about the totality of judges’ actual normative beliefs. On this
account legal science becomes a purely empirical study, i.e. a sociopsychological study of the beliefs commonly held by judges, and of
their likely judicial actions on the basis thereof.
More generally, emerging from the study of the exchanges
between Hart and Ross we see in these differences a simple, clear, and
principled way of finally making sense of the notoriously elusive
theoretical distinction between legal positivism and legal realism.

